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Abstract
It seems counterintuitive to imagine the bloodiest conflict in American history being worse, but Sheehan-
Dean argues that the death toll could have been dramatically higher without both sides’ emphasis on restraint,
as dictated by the laws of war. Most of the book is spent examining “how people on both sides justified the
lethal violence of conflict and when, how, and why they balanced cruelty and destruction.” Despite the rules of
war, however, Civil War participants, like all humans, were contradictory. Sometimes they acted instinctively
and spontaneously, while at other times, their actions were the result of deeply seated ideology. The
participants contradicted themselves and their responses to events continually changed. Sheehan-Dean
expertly places himself in participants’ shoes to analyze the exercise and restraint of violence. [excerpt]
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It seems counterintuitive to imagine the bloodiest conflict in American history being worse, but 
Sheehan-Dean argues that the death toll could have been dramatically higher without both sides’ 
emphasis on restraint, as dictated by the laws of war. Most of the book is spent examining “how 
people on both sides justified the lethal violence of conflict and when, how, and why they 
balanced cruelty and destruction.” Despite the rules of war, however, Civil War participants, like 
all humans, were contradictory. Sometimes they acted instinctively and spontaneously, while at 
other times, their actions were the result of deeply seated ideology. The participants contradicted 
themselves and their responses to events continually changed. Sheehan-Dean expertly places 
himself in participants’ shoes to analyze the exercise and restraint of violence. 
Sheehan-Dean focuses on four aspects of the conflict: Guerilla warfare, emancipation, 
imprisonment of soldiers, and occupation. He tracks how Federals and Confederates engaged 
each other on each of these issues, all of which could have easily produced unchecked lethal 
violence. Guerillas, North and South, both engaged in violent actions and provoked violent 
backlash. Confederates, too, exercised brutal retaliation while engaged in violence against black 
soldiers after the federal government’s mid-war adoption of emancipation as a war aim. The 
fueling of nationalistic sentiments by outspoken newspaper editors, politicians and ministers also 
stoked each side’s aggression, both on and off the battlefield, by further strengthening 
participants’ political resolve and casting the enemy as a dangerous force to be immediately 
suppressed through both violence and non-violent means. But what might appear as unremitting 
violence was actually largely governed by official rules of war which tempered that violence 
with great restraint. Henry Halleck, eventual General-in-Chief of the Union army, authored a 
massive volume on the rules of war and Francis Lieber’s influential Lieber Code was adopted by 
the Federal government in 1863 as a framework for governing the prosecution of the war. These 
guidelines helped set boundaries for soldiers and the public, noting when violence was 
acceptable and in what forms, and thus limiting the overall amount of bloodshed. 
The best example of the application of these rules of war is General William Sherman’s Atlanta 
Campaign. While many people label Sherman as cruel and unjust to the people of Atlanta, 
Sheehan-Dean argues that Sherman acted appropriately. Lieber wrote “warfare was not 
unrestricted violence, but violence limited by an end,” meaning that all of the violence 
committed had to serve the purpose of bringing the war to the end. Sherman had to engage in a 
certain level of violence against a core of war-enabling civilians during the siege of Atlanta to 
achieve his ultimate objective: the war’s end. However, Sherman did not give his soldiers a 
blank check for violence against civilians. Those who acted outside of the rules of war and 
committed unlawful spontaneous acts of violence against civilians were punished for their 
crimes. The Atlanta Campaign serves as a microcosm for the contradictions apparent throughout 
the war, that it was “at times a restrained conflict and at times a bloody, savage struggle. In some 
places, both of these statements were true at the same time.” 
What amazed me most was Sheehan-Dean’s disagreement with the concept of the Civil War as 
following a “limited to total war” Trajectory. Many historians have proffered that the Civil War 
began as a limited war (one of much restraint) that slowly evolved into a total, all-encompassing 
conflict. By moving past this assumed trajectory of “limited to total war,” we gain a deeper 
understanding of the ways people perceived actions as immoral or just. The lack of a clear 
evolution of violence seemed foreign to me and I initially did not agree with Sheehan-Dean, but 
his rationale made sense. During the Civil War, violence and peace occurred in different 
communities at different moments. For example, Missouri saw more violence in 1862 than did 
Atlanta, but in 1864 Atlanta witnessed more violence than Missouri. In some places, the war was 
nearly “total” in 1861 but “limited” in 1865. For Sheehan-Dean, the “limited to total” war 
paradigm is a gross overgeneralization of the war’s violence which conceals the more nuanced 
complexities and contradictions of the conflict. 
Aaron Sheehan-Dean’s The Calculus of Violence is a perspective-altering piece of Civil War 
scholarship. It is wonderfully researched, but also accessible. I constantly found myself rereading 
passages, trying to absorb as much of the book as possible. Sheehan-Dean encourages readers to 
look beyond analyzing actions as right or wrong, moral or immoral. Instead, we should seek to 
understand how and why historical actors arrived at the decisions they did. Sheehan-Dean closes 
with the reminder that conflict, and its inherent costs, is occasionally necessary if prosecuted 
according to accepted rules and necessities. In revealing the complexities and contradictions 
behind individuals’ decisions to exercise and restrain violence during the American Civil 
War, The Calculus of Violence provides a valuable window into both the on-the-ground 
operations during the conflict, as well as the human faces behind stories of bloodshed and 
salvation. 
 Aaron Sheehan-Dean will be speaking at this summer’s 2019 CWI Conference. 
 
